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It has often been proposed that new cleavages have emerged within the middle class. In
this paper, we examine the distinction between social and cultural specialists and techno-
crats, and investigate whether these new and old middle class fractions are differentiated
by their patterns of intergenerational mobility. To what extent do these newly distinguished
middle class fractions have speciﬁc external and internal intergenerational mobility patterns?
And to what extent have mobility boundaries between them been rising over time? To answer
these questions, we use 47 Dutch national population sample surveys with detailed occu-
pation codes collected between 1970 and 2006 (N = 60,978). Our analyses of internal and
external homogeneity show that the middle class fractions each have characteristic mobil-
ity and immobility patterns and therefore a necessary condition is satisﬁed to declare them
as separate classes. Furthermore, in the early periods, the social and cultural specialists
were differentiated by a high level of immobility but in the later periods, the distance
between the old and new middle classes has decreased signiﬁcantly.
Crown Copyright  2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, many students of stratiﬁcation have argued that there exist multiple fractions within the middle class
and that in post-industrial societies some of these fractions have become social classes in their own right. However, to what
extent have these fractions of the middle class acquired separate demographic identities? Following Weber’s (1978 [1922],
p. 302) famous dictum that ‘‘a ‘social class’ makes up the totality of those class situations within which individual and gen-
erational mobility is easy and typical’’, mobility analysts (Breiger, 1981; Goldthorpe, 2000) have argued that a social category
does not constitute a social class proper unless there is considerable intergenerational reproduction of class membership.
Members of social classes experience similar upward and downward mobility patterns within a society. Conversely, only
occupational categories that are similar with respect to intergenerational mobility ﬂows constitute a single social class.
By implication, if the fractions within the middle class do indeed constitute distinct classes, their intergenerational mobility
patterns should clearly differ.
In this paper, we examine the intergenerational reproduction and mobility patterns of middle-class fractions in the Neth-
erlands, an advanced post-industrial society for which a wealth of detailed intergenerational mobility data are available. We
concentrate on the distinction between the middle-class fractions of ‘technocrats’ and ‘social and cultural specialists’ that
was proposed by Kriesi (1989a,b) and which has been rigorously operationalized by Güveli (2006). While only one speciﬁc
form of new class formation, we maintain that Kriesi’s distinction is a fair summary of many of the new class conceptions2011 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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as political preferences (Güveli et al., 2007a; Lubbers and Güveli, 2007), life styles (Güveli et al., 2007b) and life course devel-
opment (Güveli and De Graaf, 2007). To do this research, we add a validation with respect to intergenerational occupational
mobility, which we believe – in line with Weber’s dictum – is the core issue in assessing class boundaries.
1.1. Theoretical background: The ‘new class’ debate
Views have varied on how to conceptualize middle-class fractions and how to validate the distinctions made between
them. Before notable others (Gouldner, 1979), Bell (1973) was among the ﬁrst to announce the coming of the post-industrial
society and to discuss the emergence of new classes in this context. He argues that post-industrial societies depend on
knowledge-based services that invoke an increased demand for ‘quality of life’ in health, education, social services, research
and the arts. Bell claims that ‘‘the major class of the emerging new society is primarily a professional class, based on knowl-
edge rather than property’’ (Bell, 1973, p. 374). The new social class does not necessarily include newly emerging occupa-
tions. In fact, professional occupations have been there from ancient times. Social trends and modes of production
prevailing in post-industrial societies make these occupations develop new class interests and speciﬁc mobility patterns.
A host of new class theorists has followed Bell’s lead and used knowledge criteria to delineate the new class. Brint (1984)
compares several conceptualisations of the ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ middle class to explain why some middle-class members have
liberal attitudes and concludes that educational differences explain most of the variations. Accordingly, the class fractions
Brint distinguishes are based on educational criteria, a view that concurs with Wright’s (1985, p. 87) conception that uses
organizational and skill/credential ‘‘assets’’ as a way to introduce professional work into an otherwise Marxist class scheme.
Lamont (1987) considers ‘‘cultural capital workers’’ as a new class, with a claim that a common class interest explains their
progressive attitudes. These common interests are to maintain and increase intellectual autonomy, to have a powerful and
large public sector, to raise taxes for the public good and implement liberal policies regarding ‘post-materialist issues’ such
as lesbian/gay rights, euthanasia and environmentalism. Similar views are typically held by authors who see educational cre-
dentials as the primary source of new class differentiation.
Other new class theorists have concentrated on the nature of the employment relations that arise in post-industrial soci-
eties and which traditionally form the primary theoretical basis of the linkage between occupation and social class. Esping-
Andersen (1993) claims that managers within the middle class ‘‘reﬂect a fordist logic of the division of labour’’, whereas the
professionals within the middle class reveal the post-fordist logic of the division of labor (Esping-Andersen, 1993, p. 13).
Consequently, he (1993, p. 24) delineates the class cleavages of the (post) industrial societies along two hierarchies, ‘‘broadly
reﬂecting the degree of authority, responsibility’’ versus ‘‘level of human capital applied’’ to work tasks in different sectors.
Note that the equivalent of Wright’s (1985) ‘‘organizational assets’’ enter here as ‘‘responsibility and authority’’ and provide a
way to deﬁne the ‘old’ middle class. Goldthorpe (2000) justiﬁes his class schema on the basis of two similar dimensions:
controllability of the work tasks and human capital needed to perform these tasks. Although Esping-Andersen (1993) had
criticized Goldthorpe’s class schema because it would not reﬂect the post-industrial class cleavages, both authors base their
class distinctions on employment relations and end up with similar conceptions.
These views echo Kriesi’s (1989a,b) earlier use of a ‘new class’ concept to explain support for social movements. This
author locates the major middle class divide between ‘‘technocrats’’ and ‘‘social and cultural specialists’’, alluding to a dis-
tinction that is implicit in Esping-Andersen’s and Goldthorpe’s later discussion of the logics of post-industrial production.
Kriesi (1989a, p. 1081) asserts that there exists ‘‘a basic antagonism of interest’’ between technocrats and social and cultural
specialists. Technocrats are supposed to preserve the integrity of the organization they work for, while social and cultural
specialists are more client-oriented and act within the body of knowledge of their discipline. Social and cultural specialists
are supposed to constitute a ‘new class’ and they are likely to support new social movements because ‘‘the specialists try to
defend their own and their clients’ relative autonomy’’ against the interventions of the technocratic controllers (Kriesi,
1989a, pp. 1085–1086).
Bourdieu (1984) makes a distinction between an economic and a cultural status hierarchy and uses occupations to mea-
sure people’s positions on these. His model effectively distinguishes two separate but correlated hierarchical dimensions to
represent status differences among occupations. Occupations with low social status, such as unskilled workers, score low on
both hierarchies, whereas some high-grade occupations score high on the cultural dimension, and other high-grade occupa-
tions score high on the economic dimension. The hierarchical status of occupations is primarily determined by the volume of
resources required in a particular ﬁeld of work. These resources themselves are divided into cultural resources (such as
knowledge) and economic resources (such as managerial and organizational skills, but also inherited property). High-grade
workers in education, health care and social services, in particular, are assumed to command cultural resources (Bourdieu,
1984, pp. 128–129) and would constitute the ‘new class’ of post-industrial societies. Occupations assumed to have relatively
greater economic resources are those of the ‘old’ middle class, such as management, proprietorship, and other commercial
and administrative occupations. Bourdieu (1984) then continues by showing pervasive distinctions between the two status
hierarchies in the realms of taste, consumption and political orientation.
Whether interpreted as an opposition between the educated and the propertied classes (Brint, 1984), cultural and eco-
nomic elites (Bourdieu, 1984), professionals and managers (Wright, 1997; Hout et al., 1995), controllers and human-capital
workers (Goldthorpe, 2000), technocrats and social and cultural specialists (Kriesi, 1989a,b), all of these distinctions imply
similar cleavages within the middle class. Bell’s (1973) post-industrial society, Bourdieu’s (1984) cultural and economic cap-
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social classes, social-cultural capital and skills have become essential classiﬁcation devices in employment relations and in
class structure alike.
The particular new class conception we examine in this study primarily builds upon Kriesi’s distinction between techno-
crats and social and cultural specialists, which we believe is the conceptually best-developed idea in the new class literature,
since it speciﬁes operational criteria to measure the distinctions. Kriesi’s separation of the middle-class fractions has been
formally operationalized by Güveli (2006) and has been validated in research by Güveli et al. (2007a,b). Inspired by Kriesi
(1989a,b), Güveli (2006) conceives the two fractions as distinct on the basis of a combination of two criteria. First, social
and cultural specialists provide services to members of society through care, education, science, arts or social work. Second,
employers struggle to control social and cultural specialists, because their performance is based on expert knowledge and
skills that cannot be acquired or monitored by others without long preparation. Social and cultural specialists meet these
two criteria at the same time. Conversely, technocrats are deﬁned as occupying middle-class positions in other sectors
(mainly government, commercial services, agricultural and industrial production), or middle-class positions in social and
cultural sectors that primarily perform supervisory or managerial duties.
1.2. Research problems and research site
Most authors involved in the new class debate validate the distinctions they make using the different positions of the
classes on outcome dimensions, such as political or moral orientations, or taste and consumption styles. As a more direct
validation, we ask to what extent different fractions of the middle class have established characteristic patterns of intergen-
erational reproduction and exclusion, and thus effectively constitute social classes in their own right with a stable demo-
graphic identity. We answer this general question using Güveli’s (2006) measurement procedure to separate the EGP
classes I and II (Erikson et al., 1979) into four fractions: An ‘old’ class of (Ia) high-grade technocrats and a ‘new’ class of
(Ib) high-grade social and cultural specialists; and an ‘old’ class of (IIa) low-grade technocrats and a ‘new’ class of (IIb)
low-grade social and cultural specialists.
We examine whether these ‘old’ and the ‘new’ classes are indeed differentiated with regard to their intergenerational
mobility patterns by using external and internal homogeneity criteria. Starting off from Weber’s dictum, Breiger (1981) was
the ﬁrst to propose homogeneity of association to decide on the collapsibility of two or more categories in a class mobility
table. According to Goodman (1981), two categories in a cross-tabulation can only be said to be collapsible, when both exter-
nal and internal homogeneity exist. External homogeneity, also referred to as ‘structural equivalence’ in network models
(Breiger and Mohr, 2004), exists when two categories are statistically independent with respect to other categories in the
table. Internal homogeneity exists when the 2  2 table between the two categories shows statistical independence.
Applied to two categories in a social mobility table, internal hetero/homogeneity refers to mutual exchanges between two
classes, whereas external hetero/homogeneity refers to their inﬂow from and outﬂow to other class categories. Our general
question about the intergenerational mobility patterns of the newly distinguished classes can be split into two sub-ques-
tions. The ﬁrst concerns the external mobility patterns of the assumed classes:
1. To what extent are (high- and low-grade) technocrats and (high- and low-grade) social and cultural specialists externally het-
erogeneous, i.e. have distinct inﬂow from and outﬂow to other social classes?
Internal homogeneity entails perfect mutual exchanges among the disaggregated classes. Only if the new and old classes
also create distinct boundaries in these mutual exchanges, is the hypothesis of a differentiated middle class fully conﬁrmed.
Our second question thus reads:
2. To what extent are (high- and low-grade) technocrats and (high- and low-grade) social and cultural specialists internally het-
erogeneous i.e. independent with respect to their mutual exchanges?
Our research site, the Netherlands between 1970 and 2006, can aptly be interpreted as an advanced post-industrial soci-
ety, as it has experienced a substantial shift in employment from agriculture and industry into the service sector. For exam-
ple, between 1960 and 1994 (the period in which our respondents typically made their occupational choices) the share of
industrial employment fell from 33% to 18%, while employment in the commercial service sector increased from 21% to
30% and employment in other service sectors rose from 19% to 34% (Asselberghs et al., 1998, p. 5). In the same period,
the country developed one of the world’s most extensive welfare systems (Cox, 1993). As a result, the number of people
employed in the public sector expanded enormously: from 19% in 1960 to 35% in 1994 (Asselberghs et al., 1998, p. 10).
The growth of the public sector is particularly relevant for the differentiation of the middle class, because many social
and cultural specialists are employed in the public sector. In brief, if one wanted to identify a country best ﬁt to test the con-
sequences of the coming of post-industrial society, the Netherlands would be a perfect choice.
The Dutch class structure has experienced changes parallel to its employment structure. The proportion of men in the
middle class (operationally deﬁned as EGP I/II) increased from 31% in 1970 to 50% in 1999 (Ganzeboom and Luijkx,
2004b), implying that today the majority of the employed Dutch population is part of the middle class. Conversely, the
proportion of men in the classes of semi-skilled, unskilled and agricultural workers decreased from 40% in 1970 to 32% in
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tween 1971 and 2002 (SCP, 2006; CBS, 2007). Their share in EGP I/II increased disproportionally, at the expense of women
in (semi-skilled and unskilled) manual work (Ganzeboom and Luijkx, 2004a). Thus, the Netherlands is a prime example of
the rise of middle classes, old or new. This creates another motivation for our analysis: when the middle classes (i.e. class I
and II in the EGP class schema) account for half of the economically active population, as is the case in the Netherlands, the
middle/working class distinction becomes less useful and it is necessary to consider whether there are meaningful internal
divisions within the middle classes.
Finally, the historical dimension of our dataset allows us to assess the claims implicit in new class theories that inequal-
ities within the middle class are on the rise in the post-industrial world:
3. To what extent have the social and cultural specialists and technocrats developed a more distinct external and internal mobility
patterns over time?
2. Expectations
Most of the new class theorists (Bell, 1973; Brint, 1984; Kriesi, 1989a; Esping-Andersen, 1993) have not focused on social
mobility patterns of the ‘new’ classes, let alone provided a theoretical account of those patterns. However, we can draw upon
the class reproduction theory of Bourdieu (1984, pp. 20, 230–232), whose ideas on economic and cultural elite formation pro-
vide a logic with which to derive expectations about changes in new class reproduction more generally. Following Bourdieu,
one can argue that differences in social mobility and reproduction between the ‘new’ classes derive from the different kinds of
resources they command. Social reproduction processes take place in the context of ﬁelds such as science, education, the arts,
commercial services and governance, which require speciﬁc resources in order to be successful. Social agents in any given ﬁeld
occupy positions, or try to create new ones, by controlling and exploiting the resources speciﬁc to the occupational roles they
perform in this ﬁeld. Bourdieu (1984, Chapter 5) claims that the cultural elite has more intellectual, creative and communi-
cation skills than the economic elite. Social and cultural specialists distinguish themselves from other occupational categories
within the middle class, being most prevalent in the ﬁelds in which cultural skills and forms are in high demand and highly
valued: care, education, science and the arts. By contrast, technocrats more often command greater economic resources, such
as organizational, commercial and managerial skills (Savage et al., 1992), which are in high demand in the ﬁelds that they
dominate: governance, commercial services and industrial and agricultural production (Goyette and Muller, 2006).
Bourdieu (1984, p. 12), Bourdieu and Passeron (1977, pp. 13–14) and Bourdieu (1990, pp. 144–146) then argues that
class-speciﬁc reproduction patterns can best be understood with reference to the skills that are speciﬁc to a class. Cultural
resources are easier to store in families than economic resources because the former are a set of internalized dispositions
(‘‘habitus’’) that govern people’s behavior (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 20, 230–232). Bourdieu (1984, pp. 80–85) also claims that
it is relatively easy to pass on cultural skills and assets to offspring, whereas transmitting commercial and organizational
skills and assets to them is relatively difﬁcult. Savage et al. (1992) add to this argument that organizational skills are difﬁcult
to store in families because of their context-speciﬁc nature. ‘‘Those with organizational assets often have to transform them
into cultural assets or property assets in order to store them and hence transmit them. This dynamic is the central feature of
middle-class formation, and the way in which this evolves in any particular society will lay the foundation for patterns of
middle-class formation’’ (Savage et al., 1992, p. 17). Bourdieu (1984, pp. 80–85) also points to the pivotal role that formal
education plays in social reproduction. Social reproduction is stronger in educational attainment than in occupational attain-
ment. As social and cultural specialists (much like Bourdieu’s cultural elite) are often more highly educated than their middle
class counterparts, one would expect the social and cultural specialists to show more closure as a social class, and increas-
ingly so, as the role of education has become more important in post-industrial societies.
2.1. External heterogeneity
Our expectations about the external heterogeneity of the middle-class fractions can be deduced from Bourdieu’s model of
economic and cultural differentiation. If the new class theories hold, we would expect that the disaggregated middle-class
fractions each have their own inﬂow and outﬂow patterns and are therefore not collapsible with one another in this respect.
More speciﬁcally, we expect that men and women with lower-status origins are particularly barred from mobility into the
social and cultural specialist fractions, due to the strict educational requirements for these positions. By contrast, educational
credentials less exclusively dominate access to technocratic positions and these positions allow for more opportunities for
entry during the (later) occupational career. Our ﬁrst hypothesis therefore states that there is more inﬂow to the technocratic
fractions from the lower social classes than to the social and cultural specialists fractions. On the other hand, we expect the
offspring of the social and cultural specialists to be more resistant to downward mobility than their counterparts with technocratic
origins.
2.2. Internal heterogeneity
If the two middle-class fractions would constitute one single class, intergenerational mobility among themwould be ‘per-
fect’. That is, origin fraction would not matter for the odds of entering one fraction or the other, provided someone is destined
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mobility by showing class-speciﬁc immobility, which is driven by occupation-speciﬁc transfer of resources (Weeden and
Grusky, 2005). Both fractions can be expected to command such resources: these may involve the intergenerational transfer
of occupation-speciﬁc knowledge, social contacts, aspirations, or the transfer of property. Setting this aside, we still expect
that intergenerational immobility is easier to maintain for the social and cultural specialists than for the technocrats, as the
required resources are easier to store and reproduce within families. Therefore, our second hypothesis reads: the social and
cultural specialists are intergenerationally more immobile than the technocrats.
2.3. Inheritance of class position over time
If a social class is a new class we can assume that it needs time to crystallise. Goldthorpe (1982, p. 181) argues that a social
class goes through a process of organizing its class interests. The ‘‘classes acquire a demographic identity – that is, become
identiﬁable as collectivities through the continuity with which individuals and families retain their class positions over time’’
(Goldthorpe, 1982, pp. 171–172). Only when this process has been completed, do the members of a class act in accordance
with their class interests. Over time, we would therefore expect an increase in inheritance of class position for new classes of
social and cultural specialists, as well as a more a declining amount of exchanges with other classes. However, the Nether-
lands, even more than other advanced societies (Breen and Luijkx, 2004), has been experiencing a clear general trend to-
wards more social ﬂuidity and less social reproduction. This general trend does not necessarily rule out that the ‘new’
classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists have been able to increase their capacities to reproduce
their social positions. Our third hypothesis speciﬁcally holds that over time the social and cultural specialists have become more
intergenerationally immobile than the technocrats, but only relative to the over-all trend towards higher social mobility and more
social ﬂuidity that we know to exist in the Netherlands.3. Measurement, data and methods
3.1. Distinguishing technocrats and social and cultural specialists
The EGP class schema has become the de facto standard indicator of class positions in intergenerational mobility research
(Erikson et al., 1979; Ganzeboom et al., 1989; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen, 2004). Güveli (2006) used this class sche-
ma as point of departure and distinguished the four fractions by differentiating the middle classes EGP-I and EGP-II. Previous
authors have almost exclusively relied on ﬁatmeasurement. Moreover, none of them have documented their class and occu-
pational distinctions in any detailed and tractable way. By contrast, in order to develop a valid and reliable categorization,
Güveli (2006) asked 12 labor market experts to allocate all occupations in EGP classes I and II to a class of technocrats or a
class of social and cultural specialists. The experts were presented with detailed descriptions of 293 middle-class occupa-
tions that were derived from the Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations 1984 [SBC-84] of Statistics Netherlands, as well
as with the criteria used by Güveli (Güveli et al., 2007a; Güveli, 2006, p. 31) to deﬁne social and cultural specialists versus
technocrats. These criteria can be summarized as follows: occupations are to be classiﬁed as social and cultural specialists if
the tasks are relatively difﬁcult to monitor by employers and if the basic tasks consist of social services and/or are based on
specialized knowledge in social and cultural issues; occupations are to be allocated into the fraction of technocrats, if their
tasks are relatively easy to monitor by their employer or if the basic tasks in these occupations consist of controlling employ-
ees. An occupation was to receive a score of 1 when an expert allocated this occupation into the class of technocrats and a
score of 2 when the expert allocated this occupation into the class of social and cultural specialists. There was strong agree-
ment among the experts about the allocation of occupations in one class or the other: the KR20 reliability coefﬁcient (alpha
coefﬁcient for dichotomous items) is higher than 0.946; no expert disagreed strongly with the others and overall reliability
could not be improved by leaving out experts. Then the mean expert allocation score was calculated for each occupation. For
45% of the occupations there was perfect agreement among the experts. Occupations with scores below 1.3 and above 1.7
(77% of the total) were simply allocated to the nearest category. The remaining occupations (23% of the total) about which
the experts were more in disagreement, were allocated by Güveli in consultation with some of the experts. Fig. 1 shows the
classes within the adjusted EGP class schema with typical occupational categories belonging to these classes. The full clas-
siﬁcation and conversion tools are documented in Güveli (2006) and available online (www.ayseguveli.nl).
3.2. Data
Our 47 nationally representative random sample surveys have been collected in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2006
and include detailed father-to-son and father-to-daughter-mobility ﬂows among 32,965 men and 28,013 women.1 The data
have been harmonized and produced as part of the International Stratiﬁcation and Mobility File (ISMF). The sources of these
surveys are listed in Appendix A – Table A1. From the ISMF, we selected all ﬁles on the Netherlands that contain detailed occu-
pation codes, as well as sufﬁcient information on self-employment and supervisory status, both of which are needed to create1 This is a weighted sample size that applies throughout our analysis. See Appendix A – Table A1 about the particular weights applied.
EGP
Adjusted 
EGP
Class name Occupations
I
Ia High-grade technocrats Managers of large firms, governmental and non-governmental administrators, physical scientists, etc.
Ib High-grade social and cultural 
specialists
Medical doctors, dentists, university teachers, social 
scientists, high church officers etc.
II
IIa Low-grade technocrats Managers of small firms, engineers, computer programmers, accountants, etc.
IIb Low-grade social and cultural 
specialists
Medical assistants, professional nurses, teachers, 
journalists, artists, etc.
IIIa IIIa Routine non-manual workers Routine clerical employees in administration and 
commerce, rank and file service workers
IIIb IIIb Sales and personal service workers Sales and personal service workers
IVa IVa Small employers Small proprietors with employees
IVb IVb Own-account workers Small proprietors without employees
V V Manual supervisors Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual 
workers
VI VI Skilled manual workers Skilled manual workers
VIIa VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers Semi- and unskilled manual workers
VIIb VIIb Farm labourers Farm labourers
IVc IVc Self-employed farmers Self-employed farmers
Fig. 1. EGP and adjusted EGP class schema, class name and some examples of occupational groups.
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veys available on the country, including national election studies, demographic surveys, and major international projects such
as ISSP, ISJP and ESS. To a considerable extent, our data overlap with the data examined by Breen and Luijkx (2004), who tested
the quality of the surveys explicitly and found no ﬂaws (Breen and Luijkx, 2004, pp. 403–405).
The data originally contained a variety of detailed occupation codes: while a majority of the data have been categorized
according to the 1971/1984 standard occupational classiﬁcation [SBC-84] of Statistics Netherlands, both older and newer
Dutch classiﬁcations have been used, and, in a number of international ﬁles, occupational measures have been based on
either the 1968 or 1988 version of the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations [ISCO-68, ISCO-88]. In the ISMF,
all ﬁles have been internationally harmonized employing both the 1968 and 1988 version of ISCO, and conversions of both
codes into the EGP class categories are available (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 2003). In order to diverge as little as possible
from the Güveli (2006) measurement procedure, we have constructed the adjusted class categories in two ways. For all
the data ﬁles in which occupations were measured using the SBC-84 occupation code, we constructed the categories using
its close relative,2 ISCO-68, as the conversion tool. For the remaining ﬁles, we used the ISCO-88 classiﬁcation as our conversion
tool. We have experimented with exchanging and combining the two different conversion tools, but have not found any sys-
tematic divergence between them.
Only respondents aged between 25 and 64 years old are included in the analysis. Respondents’ class is typically identiﬁed
on the basis of their current or last occupation. The class of respondents’ father is usually identiﬁed on the basis of the occu-
pation the father had when the respondent was around 15 years old.
We distinguish seven periods to make over-time comparisons: (1) 1970–1974; (2) 1975–1979; (3) 1980–1984; (4)
1985–1989; (5) 1990–1994; (6) 1995–1999 and (7) 2000–2006. Table 1a and 1b display the relative frequencies of the class
categories in the seven periods for women and men respectively. Table 1a shows that the share of men in the class of high-
grade technocrats increased from 13% to 19% while the percentage of men in the class of low-grade technocrats increased
from 11% to 19%. Table 1b shows that women were under-represented in technocratic occupations in early periods but that
the proportion of women in these occupations has increased gradually over time. The share of women in the class of the
high-grade technocrats rose from 4% in 1970 to 7% in 2006, while it increased at an even more dramatic rate in the class
of low-grade technocrats, from 3% to 12%.
Men’s representation (Table 1a) in the class of high-grade social and cultural specialists remained stable between 1970
and 2006 (around 2.5%) whereas the percentage of men in the class of low-grade social and cultural specialists has more than
doubled, from 6% to 12%. Table 1b shows that the percentage of women in the class of high-grade social and cultural
specialists has increased from 1% in 1970 to 4% in 2006. Women are relatively over-represented in the class of low-grade
social and cultural specialists in the beginning of the period but this proportion increased only slowly, from 17% to 21%,
between 1970 and 2006. In sum, it is clear that more and more Dutch workers have become employed in middle-class
occupations. However, it is not so clear that the share of the ‘new’ class of social and cultural specialists has been rising dis-
proportionately. In fact, for both men and women, the increase in the share of social and cultural specialists has been slower
than the share of technocrats.2 ISCO-68 and SBC-84 have a one-to-one correspondence at the three-digit level.
Table 1a
Class structure for men in the labor force for seven 5-years periods, Netherlands 1970–2006.
1970–
1974
1975–
1979
1980–
1984
1985–
1989
1990–
1994
1995–
1999
2000–
2006
Total
Ia. High-grade technocrats 13.0 11.9 11.4 11.7 12.8 16.9 18.6 15.0
Ib. High-grade social and cultural
specialists
2.5 1.5 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.2
IIa. Low-grade technocrats 10.6 12.3 11.3 11.7 17.7 19.5 19.3 16.5
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural
specialists
5.6 9.2 10.6 10.0 11.6 10.5 11.9 10.6
IIIa. Routine non-manual 9.5 12.1 12.2 13.5 11.8 9.9 9.0 10.8
IIIb. Sales and personal service workers 3.6 4.5 4.9 6.7 4.1 3.5 3.7 4.2
IVa. Self-employed with employees 4.1 2.6 1.6 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.9 2.0
IVb. Self-employed without employees 4.9 2.9 2.1 3.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.0
V. Manual supervisors 2.2 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.5 4.9 3.9 3.9
VI. Skilled manual workers 19.3 20.2 21.0 17.4 15.6 13.2 12.1 15.3
VIIa. Unskilled manual workers 16.5 12.0 13.6 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.4 13.2
VIIb. Farm laborers 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3
IVc. Farmers 6.0 5.1 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.2 2.2 3.0
Total N 1787 3008 2368 4003 5140 9050 7609 32,965
Table 1b
Class structure for women in the labor force for seven 5-years periods, Netherlands 1970–2006.
1970–
1974
1975–
1979
1980–
1984
1985–
1989
1990–
1994
1995–
1999
2000–
2006
Total
Ia. High-grade technocrats 3.9 1.7 0.9 1.6 3.0 5.0 6.7 4.4
Ib. High-grade social and cultural
specialists
1.2 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.7 3.5 2.4
IIa. Low-grade technocrats 2.6 4.1 4.3 5.2 7.1 12.9 11.7 9.7
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural
specialists
16.5 18.1 14.4 16.6 20.6 17.3 20.7 18.6
IIIa. Routine non-manual 24.2 22.9 24.5 25.1 27.4 23.2 22.1 23.8
IIIb. Sales and personal service workers 14.9 15.8 16.8 19.1 13.1 17.7 13.0 15.5
IVa. Self-employed with employees 3.3 0.8 0.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.9 0.9
IVb. Self-employed without employees 5.1 3.0 2.3 3.7 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.1
V. Manual supervisors 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4
VI. Skilled manual workers 5.1 3.5 4.6 3.2 3.8 2.5 2.8 3.1
VIIa. Unskilled manual workers 20.8 25.6 29.6 20.7 18.6 15.0 14.8 17.6
VIIb. Farm laborers 1.1 1.3 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.8
IVc. Farmers 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
Total N 571 1019 2054 2858 4355 8439 8717 28,013
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Appendix A – Tables A2 and A3 show the patterns of outﬂow from origin class to destination class for men and women for
all datasets and periods together.3 These tables constitute the basic material for the statistical analysis reported below. Our task
is to develop models for the association patterns in these tables. We need to determine whether the technocrats and the social
and cultural specialists have characteristic mobility patterns and how these patterns can be efﬁciently represented. As men-
tioned before, we use external and internal homogeneity/heterogeneity criteria for doing this. By means of these criteria, we effec-
tively test whether these categories are collapsible or should remain disaggregated (Goodman, 1981). We show in Fig. 2 the
homogeneity/heterogeneity criteria as applied in our analysis (cfr. Goodman (1981) for similar displays).
The condition of external homogeneity applies to the cells that represent mobility between, on the one hand, the classes
considered for dis/aggregation and, on the other hand, all the other categories in the table. The cells relevant to the external
homogeneity criterion for collapsing, the high-grade technocrats (Ia) and the high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib), are
shaded with diagonal lines. The cells relevant to the external homogeneity criterion for collapsing the low-grade technocrats
(IIa) and the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb) are shaded in reversed diagonal lines. The condition of external
homogeneity means that the respective two classes have identical inﬂow to and outﬂow from the other classes and this im-
plies that statistical independence exists in this part of the table. If the hypothesis of external homogeneity is rejected, the
relevant classes are said to be externally heterogeneous.
The condition of internal homogeneity versus heterogeneity pertains to the cells that represent mobility among the clas-
ses that are considered for collapsing. In the case of the class of high-grade technocrats and the class of the high-grade social3 The detailed counts that are used in our analyses are available from the ﬁrst author upon request.
Fig. 2. Overview of the heterogeneity/homogeneity criteria for classes Ia, Ib, IIa and IIb in a 13-by-13-mobility table.
A. Güveli et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 224–241 231and cultural specialists this means that there is statistical independence in the cells marked ‘‘s’’ in Fig. 2 and that mobility
between them is ‘perfect’. Internal homogeneity for the class of low-grade technocrats and the class of low-grade social and
cultural specialists stands for perfect mobility between these two classes – these cells are marked ‘‘d’’ in Fig. 2. If the con-
dition of local independence is rejected, the relevant classes are said to be internally heterogeneous.
It is possible that external heterogeneity applies while internal heterogeneity does not, and vice versa. Furthermore, the
reader will note that we can test the internal and external homogeneity of classes Ia and Ib as well as for classes IIa and IIb
simultaneously. We then ﬁt the model of independence on the shaded area plus the cells marked ‘‘s’’ and ‘‘d’’ in Fig. 2.
Our tests of heterogeneity are based on scaled uniform association models, which were developed by Goodman (1979)
and Hauser (1984a,b). Luijkx (1994) shows how these models can test for local independence by using equality constraints
on the scaling parameters and are thus equivalent to the tests of collapsibility used by Goodman (1981). The starting point of
the scaled association model is the uniform association model that assumes all contiguous (log) odds ratios in a table are
identical:ln hij ¼ u ð1Þ
The uniform association model uses a single degree of freedom to characterize all odds ratios in a table, which is a highly
parsimonious but often a too-restrictive assumption to ﬁt the data. This stringent assumption can be meaningfully modiﬁed
in three ways:
(1) By scaling the distances between the row (li) and column (mj) categories:ln hij ¼ uðliþ1  liÞðmjþ1  mjÞ ð2Þ
where li and mj are scaling parameters, subject to the constraints of mean 0 and variance 1, while u is the scaled uniform
association parameter that describes the association throughout the table, conditional upon the scaling parameters.
(2) As a useful special restriction in the scaled model we can introduce equal scaling parameters for rows and columns:
li ¼ mi ð3Þi.e., rows and columns are identically scaled. This does not only lead to a more parsimonious model, but has the useful
sociological interpretation that row and columns (origins and destinations) constitute the same hierarchy with respect to
mobility chances.
(3) By excluding diagonal cells from the association pattern through ﬁtting distinct diagonal parameters diik. Excluding
diagonal cells (and separately modelling them) parallels the assumption that staying in father’s class (i.e., class inher-
itance) is not necessarily governed by the same contingencies as the pattern of mobility for the mobile. The diagonal
density parameters diik represent within-class immobility over and above the immobility uniformly inherent to all
categories.
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man/Hauser model, named after its principal inventors (Goodman, 1979; Hauser, 1984a,b). The model uses a limited number
of degrees of freedom to characterize the pattern of association within tables. In our 13  13 tables, the 144 elementary odds
ratios are summarized by 134 scaling parameters (equal for row and columns), one over-all scaled uniform association param-
eter, and thirteen diagonal cell parameters.
Scaled association models are very powerful tools, not only to characterize a mobility pattern, but also to investigate over-
time developments, because they allow us to concentrate between-table differences in a few parameters. Using over-time
constraints can strengthen this. We will constrain li and mj to be the same for tables from different periods. We will then
assemble over-time differences in a single diagonal density parameter (dii) and in the scaled association parameter (uk)
by using over-time constraints. Regarding the diagonal effects diik, we assume that the development over time is the same
for each diagonal cell i, but that the density per cell i varies such as:4 Not
5 The
contribdiik ¼ dii  bk
diik ¼ dii  ð1þ bYÞ
diik ¼ dii  ð1þ bY þ cY2Þ
ð4Þfor respectively a (uniform) trendless, a linear and a curvilinear development of the diagonal densities.
3.3.1. Strong and weak versions of the internal homogeneity criterion
The QERC-II model contains parameters that separately model the diagonal densities. These diagonal coefﬁcients repre-
sent immobility in classes over and above the density for the diagonals implied by the scaled association parameters. The
condition of internal homogeneity can ﬁt without such class-speciﬁc diagonal coefﬁcients. The condition of internal homo-
geneity thus understood is the strong version. However, it is likely that this criterion does not fully apply. In this case, we can
weaken the internal homogeneity criterion by including selected parameters of class inheritance in the model. The relevant
cells are marked ‘‘h’’ and ‘‘j’’ in Fig. 2. This then is the weak version of internal homogeneity.
Fig. 2 shows the application of internal and external homogeneity conditions for collapsing classes Ia and Ib into one class
and for collapsing classes IIa and IIb into another. Note, however, that another option would be to examine the higher–lower
boundary; that is, to collapse the classes Ia and IIa into one class and to collapse classes Ib and IIb into another class. Again,
we would conclude that these classes could be collapsed, if both the external and internal homogeneity conditions apply.4. Results
To test whether the internal and external homogeneity criteria are met or heterogeneity prevails, we compare a range of
log-linear models in Table 2. Column 1 shows the model speciﬁcation and Column 3 presents the ﬁt measures (L2) of the
estimated models for men, while Column 5 does so for women. Column 2 shows the degrees of freedoms (df) of these models
for both men and women. Columns 4 and 6 show the Bayesian Information Coefﬁcient (BIC), calculated as L2  df  ln(N). The
BIC score (Raftery, 1986) is an appropriate device with which to compare models when one has large sample sizes, which
applies here, and will be our main guidance. While even substantively negligible margins of misﬁt will produce signiﬁcant
L2 values, BIC will appropriately correct for sample size. Models with more negative BIC are to be preferred. Thus we use BIC
to ﬁnd the best ﬁtting model, while the L2 statistics only serve to assure the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference between
models. Our models are estimated in LEM (Vermunt, 1997), but we have re-estimated some of the models in SPSS GENLOG to
re-express the estimated parameters into a standardized metric.
4.1. Baseline models and class inheritance
Panel A of Table 2 shows the baseline models. We start model selection with the independence (Model A0) and the quasi-
independence (Model A1) models to see whether there is any (off-diagonal) association between the classes of origin and
destination. Model A0 tests the null-hypothesis that there is no association at all, while Model A1 implies that association
only occurs on the main diagonal. Both models have a very poor ﬁt and the BIC statistics are positive, so there is considerable
association between the classes of origin and destination, also outside the diagonal.
Model A2 of Table 2 is the equal row and column model II [ERC-II]. It allows for 13 scaling parameters (l = m) and one
association parameter u to model the association between origin and destination, for diagonal and off-diagonal cells at
the same time. Model A3 is the Quasi Equal Row and Column model II (QERC-II), i.e. the diagonal cells are excluded from
the estimation of the scaled association parameters.5 Previous research has found that the QERC-II model is the best model
for revealing patterns in an intergenerational mobility table (Hout, 1983). This is also true for our data: note that for both
men and women, its BIC is the lowest throughout the table. This remains true when in Model A4 we relax the equality con-e that these 13 parameters consume only 11 of freedom, due to the restrictions used in standardization.
se diagonal densities by themselves do not contain information relevant to the distances between the categories, but the ﬁt of the diagonal densities
utes to the overall model-ﬁt and lack-of-ﬁt may inﬂuence the estimated li = mj parameters.
Table 2
Log-linear models for homogeneity of the middle class fractions for men and women between 25 and 64 years old ([Nmen = 32,965] [Nwomen = 28,013]).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Men Women
df L2 BIC L2 BIC
Panel A: Baseline models (N) (32,965) (28,013)
A0. Independence model 144 7599.3 6101.2 3580.0 2105.4
A1. Quasi-independence model 131 2990.1 1627.3 2466.4 1124.9
A2. Equal Row and Column Model II 132 2843.4 1470.2 730.4 621.3
A3. Quasi-equal Row and Column Model II 119 768.6 469.4 416.2 802.4
A4. Quasi Row and Column Model II 108 671.9 451.6 393.5 712.5
Panel B: External heterogeneity (N) (27,101) (23,580)
B1. A3 + without diagonal cells Ia, Ib, IIa and IIb 107 722.4 369.8 389.2 688.1
B2. B1 + Identical scaling for Ia and Ib, for IIa and IIb 109 740.6 372.0 421.6 675.8
B3. B1 + Identical scaling for Ia and IIa, for Ib and IIb 109 724.7 387.9 415.0 682.4
B4. B1 + Identical scaling for Ia, Ib, IIa and IIb 110 740.8 382.0 425.4 682.1
Panel C: Internal heterogeneity (N) (5864) (4433)
C1. Independence 9 260.3 182.2 97.0 21.4
C2. Quasi independence 5 15.5 27.9 12.7 29.3
C3. Quasi-independence + scaling 3 2.3 23.8 4.6 20.6
C4. C3 + Identical scaling for Ia and IIa, for Ib and IIb 4 11.2 23.5 6.7 26.9
C5. C4 + . . . (strong version) 6 110.9 58.8 49.5 0.9
C6. C3 + Identical scaling for Ia and Ib, for IIa and IIb 4 12.8 22.0 12.6 20.9
C7. C6 + . . . (strong version) 6 187.2 135.1 72.9 22.5
Panel D: Internal plus external heterogeneity (N) (32,965) (28,012)
D1. A3 + Identical scaling for Ia and Ib, for IIa and IIb (weak version) 121 834.8 424.0 530.1 709.0
D2. D1 + Ia and Ib, IIa and IIb are independent from each other (strong version) 123 1014.2 265.4 601.3 658.3
D3. A3 + Identical scaling for Ia and IIa, for Ib and IIb (weak version) 121 832.1 426.7 511.7 727.4
D4. D3 + Ia and IIa, Ib and IIb are independent from each other (strong version) 123 900.3 379.3 571.3 688.3
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a single underlying social hierarchy.
Fig. 3 presents the scalings estimated in Model A3 for men and women separately, in their standardized format. For both
men and women, the maximum distance among the classes is between the agricultural workers (VIIb) and the high-grade
social and cultural specialists (Ib). The values imply that for both men and women, it is more difﬁcult to enter the classes of
the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib and IIb) than the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia
and IIa). The symmetry of the model implies that the same holds for outﬂow. Hence this ﬁnding conﬁrms our ﬁrst hypothesis
that there is more inﬂow to the technocratic fractions from the lower social classes than to the social and cultural specialists
fractions, and the technocrats are more likely to be downwardly mobile.
In Fig. 4, we compare the 13 inheritance parameters of Model A1 and Model A3. With these inheritance parameters, that
measure the densities on the diagonal of the mobility table, we can test our second hypothesis, that the social and cultural
specialists are inter-generationally more immobile than the technocrats. The differences between the two sets of parameters
showwhat happens if we take the off-diagonal association into account. Fig. 4 shows that, under the assumption that there is
no association between origin and destination outside the main diagonal (gray bars), both the male and female high- and
low-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib and IIb) are more likely to inherit their fathers’ class positions than the male
and female high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia and IIa). These results, taken at face value, would support our second
hypothesis.
If one takes the association outside the main diagonal into account (black bars), the class inheritance of men decreases a
bit (except for the self-employed classes), but the relation between the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists, on
the one hand, and the high- and low-grade technocrats, on the other, remains the same as it was in Model A1. The differences
in immobility coefﬁcients between Ia and Ib, and between IIa and IIb are statistically signiﬁcant (not shown). This again sup-
ports our second hypothesis. However, the picture is different for women, among whom the high-grade technocrats are more
likely to be immobile than their social and cultural counterparts. In fact, the high-grade female technocrats (Ia) inherit their
father’s class position more often than their male counterparts do! This is an interesting ﬁnding, but it contradicts our
hypothesis 2, which states that social and cultural specialists are more immobile than technocrats. By contrast, for women
in low-grade middle class occupations, there is almost no difference in inheritance between technocrats and social and cul-
tural specialists. If tested (not shown), the difference in inheritance between IIa and IIb is not signiﬁcant. This also contra-
dicts our second hypothesis. Finally, observe that for women in general the inheritance of class positions in Model A3 is
much lower than in Model A1 (with the exception of the self-employed) and even becomes slightly negative for the high-
grade social and cultural specialists: these women inherit their fathers’ class position less frequently than we would expect
given the scaling components of the model.
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Fig. 3. Distance (scalings) between the social classes for men and women (Model A3 of Table 2).
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Fig. 4. Inheritance of class position of all social classes of Model A1 and A3 of Table 2 for men and women.
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Panel B of Table 2 examines the external heterogeneity of the assumed classes separately. The models in this panel test
the null hypotheses that the relative mobility patterns between the four middle class fractions and the other classes are
homogeneous. For models B, we have omitted all cells that constitute (im)mobility among and within the four middle-class
fractions, in order to concentrate exclusively on the exchanges between the middle classes and the rest. Omitting these cells
fromModel A3 leads to Model B1, which is the baseline for examining external heterogeneity. In Model B2, we have equated
the scaling parameter of the high-grade technocrats (Ia) with the scaling parameter of the high-grade social and cultural spe-
cialists (Ib). We have simultaneously equated the scaling parameter of the low-grade technocrats (IIa) with the scaling param-
eter of the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb). By contrast, in Model B3, we have equated the scaling parameter of
the high-grade technocrats with that of the low-grade technocrats (Ia and IIa) and we have equated the scaling parameter of
the high-grade social and cultural specialists with that of the low-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib and IIb). In Model
B4, all four classes are constrained to have the same scaling, effectively making them externally homogeneous. Note that
each constraint corresponds to the local independence tests for structure as proposed by Goodman (1981), but that in
our methodology we use constrained parameters to implement the model. For men, the comparisons of the BIC scores of
these four models show that B3 ﬁts the data better than other models. This implies that both classes of technocrats exhibit
external mobility patterns dissimilar from the social and cultural specialists, but that the high/low grade distinction does not
matter. That is, disregarding the higher–lower distinction within the middle class ﬁts the data better than disregarding the
distinction between the horizontal fractions. While not anticipated, this ﬁnding clearly supports the new class thesis. For
women, the BIC comparison favors the baseline Model B1, which implies that both the technocrat/social and cultural spe-
cialist and the high/low grade distinctions need to be maintained. Note, however, that also for women Model B3 is better
than Model B2. For women as well, the new class boundaries are more pronounced than the hierarchical distinction. Alto-
gether this supports the thesis of a new class differentiation.4.3. Internal heterogeneity of the assumed classes
Models C1–C7 concentrate exclusively on mobility among the four middle-class fractions. The comparison of C1 and C2
repeats the earlier observation that there is signiﬁcant inheritance within each of the four categories. Model C3 adds four
scaling parameters for the off-diagonal association. This improves the model ﬁt by classical criteria (the difference in L2 is
statistically signiﬁcant), but not according to the BIC measure. Models C4 and C6 investigate the collapsibility of the classes
over the status divide (Ia = Ib and IIa = IIb), respectively over the divide between technocrats and social-cultural specialists
(Ia = IIa and Ib = IIb). This comparison leads to the same conclusion about the class hierarchy as for external mobility in panel
B. We ﬁnd that collapsing Ia and IIa, respectively Ib and IIb (i.e. collapsing over the status boundary, as in Model C4) would ﬁt
slightly better than collapsing the distinction between technocrats and social-cultural specialists, as in Model C6. However,
while the quasi-independence Model C2 does not ﬁt the data according to classical test criteria, it remains the best-ﬁtting
model in this panel according to BIC. This would suggest that internal heterogeneity criteria do not differentiate among the
four middle-class fractions: once subjects are mobile in this internal mobility table, origins and destinations become indis-
tinguishable. In Models C5 and C7, we estimate the strong versions of the models, in which classes are collapsed across the
status boundary, respectively across the new class boundary. Both strong versions need to be rejected, implying that the
class-speciﬁc densities are indeed strong within each of the four middle-class fractions, and that this does not generalize
to the sub-diagonals.
All in all, the analysis of internal mobility leaves us with no simple conclusions. Whereas the best-ﬁtting model according
to BIC implies that there are essentially no boundaries for short-distance mobility other than class-speciﬁc inheritance, the
models that ﬁt best according to classical criteria (C3) imply such boundaries, both with respect to high/low grade and with
respect to technocrats/social and cultural specialists boundary. In fact, the two respective parameters are statistically signif-
icant, although the signiﬁcance for the status boundary for women is only marginally so (cfr. C3 and C4 for women).4.4. Internal and external heterogeneity of the assumed classes combined
Models D1–D4 examine internal heterogeneity combined with external heterogeneity. These models test at the same
time the null-hypothesis that there is perfect relative mobility among the fractions of the middle class and whether the
mobility between these fractions and the other classes in society is homogeneous. In Model D1, the scaling parameter of
the high-grade technocrats is equated with that of the high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ia = Ib) and the scaling
parameter of the low-grade technocrats is equated with that of the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIa = IIb). In
other words, are the origins and destinations of classes Ia and Ib statistically independent? The same test is performed by
Model D2. Model D1 assumes that there is direct inheritance of class position (weak version of internal homogeneity), while
Model D2 does not (strong version). Model D2 signiﬁcantly worsens the model ﬁt according to L2 and BIC scores. However,
the important observation is that Model D1 ﬁts considerably worse than Model A3. Hence, we can conclude that mobility
between the origin and destination of the high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural specialists and
the origin and destination of the low-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists is not homogeneous.
Table 3
Log-linear models of social reproduction and its over-time development for men and women between 25 and 64 years old in seven periods, 1970–2006
([Nmen = 32,965] [Nwomen = 28,012]).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Men Women
df L2 BIC L2 BIC
E1. Heterogeneous scalings, all class inheritance different by period 833 1565.6 7100.3 1172.0 7358.3
E2. Homogeneous scalings, all class inheritance different by period 899 1662.1 7690.4 1282.0 7924.2
E3. No change of class inheritance over periods 977 1799.7 8364.2 1390.4 8614.5
E4. General inheritance different by periods 971 1751.8 8349.8 1378.5 8564.9
E5. Linear constrained inheritance over periods, one slope 976 1764.2 8389.3 1382.6 8612.0
E6. Inheritance different by periods, three groups 956 1754.1 8191.4 1366.3 8423.5
E7. Linear constrained inheritance over periods, three slopes 974 1760.1 8372.6 1382.5 8591.7
E8. Linear constrained inheritance over periods, two slopes 975 1760.5 8382.6 1382.6 8601.9
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ports our second hypothesis.
Model D3 and D4 test whether the middle class is differentiated with regard to internal and external mobility over the
higher grade-lower grade boundary. In these models the scaling parameters of the high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia = IIa)
are equated with each other and so are the scaling parameters of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists
(Ib = IIb). The differences between Model D3 and D4 are that Model D3 assumes that there is also inheritance of class posi-
tions (weak version of internal homogeneity) while Model D4 does not (strong version). Model D4 signiﬁcantly worsens the
ﬁt relative to that of Model D3 according to L2 and BIC scores, for both men and women. However, note again that none of
these models ﬁt the data better than Model A3. Again, the conclusion must be that heterogeneity of all the four middle frac-
tions prevails. Note, however, that Model D3 ﬁts the data better than Model D1, though only marginally so for men. This
implies that collapsing over the status boundary would harm the conclusions less than collapsing over the new class
boundary.
4.5. Heterogeneity of class positions over time
In order to test our third hypothesis on historical developments, Table 3 shows models for the over-time dynamics of
class positions between 1970 and 2006, divided into seven periods. All models in Table 3 also contain a parameter u for
the off-diagonal association that freely varies over periods, to control for the overall trend in social ﬂuidity. Fig. 5 presents
these association parameters of Model E36 over the seven 5-year periods for men and women separately. It conﬁrms earlier
analyses of similar data (Ganzeboom and Luijkx, 2004a,b), that in the Netherlands the association between origin and destina-
tion has gradually, but consistently weakened between 1970 and 2006 for men, while the association for women in the ﬁrst
three periods increased and then has decreased gradually as well. In the most recent period, the association between origin
and destination is almost equal for men and women. It is against this background of overall decrease in association that we
address trends in immobility patterns among the middle class fractions.
Model E1 is the fully heterogeneous model, which allows class scalings to vary freely between the seven tables, while
imposing no constraint on the diagonal cells that represent direct inheritance of class positions. These heterogeneous sca-
lings are found to be remarkably similar between tables, as the comparison with the fully homogeneous Model E2 shows.
Thus this over-all test suggests that the relative class positions have remained the same and this is conﬁrmed by a further
in-depth analysis with linearly constrained scalings (not shown). In particular the results do in no way conﬁrm the third
hypothesis that the distance between social and cultural specialist and technocrats in external mobility have widened over
time.
However, signiﬁcant over-time variations are found with respect to internal mobility, as the next batch of models shows.
Our third hypothesis holds that the social and cultural specialists have become more immobile over time. Models E3–E8 of
Table 3 build up to a detailed test of this hypothesis. Model E3 assumes that the class inheritances remain the same for all
periods. (The inheritance parameters of this model are essentially the same as the inheritance parameters of Model A3 in
Table 2 as presented in Fig. 4.) Model E5 assumes that the average level of inheritance common to all classes taken together
(dii) varies over time by a time-dependent constant. This is a signiﬁcant improvement by classical criteria, but not measured
by BIC. Model E5 assumes that the class inheritance of all classes (as modelled in E3) changes according to a linear trend. This
is a clearly signiﬁcant improvement for men, and marginally so for women. In Model E6 we group the diagonal densities for
social and cultural specialist (Ib and IIb), technocrats (Ia and IIa) and the remaining classes, and these freely vary by period.
While this model is not an improvement, it constitutes a useful baseline for a more detailed linear trend analysis. Model E7
respeciﬁes Model E5 by separating this single slope into three, one for the social and cultural specialists, one for the6 These parameters could have been taken from the other models in Table 3 as well – there are essentially insensitive to the treatment of the diagonal
densities.
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Fig. 6. Trends in inheritance of class position of the technocrats, the social and cultural specialists and the other social classes over periods (between 1970
and 2006) for men and women (Model E6 of Table 3).
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A. Güveli et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 224–241 237technocrats and one for the remaining classes; Model E8 does the same with a two slope model, in which inheritance of class
positions among social and cultural specialist is treated separately from that of the other classes.
Best-ﬁtting amongst Models E1 through E7 for men is the one slope Model E5, but the two slope Model E8 comes close.
For women the one slope Model E5 is second to the no-slope model, but the estimated slope in Model E5 is still marginally
signiﬁcant. Fig. 6 displays the parameters for the inheritance of class position, as estimated in Model E6. For men the results
imply that direct inheritance is signiﬁcantly declining for all classes and that there is weak evidence that the down trend
among social and cultural specialist is steeper than among the other classes. This is a strong rejection of hypothesis 3. For
women, we do not ﬁnd string evidence for any trend, which is a somewhat weaker rejection of the hypothesis. In summary,
we have not found any support for our third hypothesis, that the social and cultural specialists become relatively more
immobile over time.
5. Conclusions and discussion
We have examined the patterns of intergenerational mobility of the middle-class fractions as distinguished by Güveli
(2006) and Güveli et al. (2007a): a technocratic and a social and cultural specialist fraction within the middle class with both
238 A. Güveli et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 224–241a higher and a lower echelon. We have investigated whether these assumedmiddle-class fractions have speciﬁc mobility pat-
terns and consequently differentiate themselves as separate social classes.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis stated that the technocrats exchange more with lower classes than the social and cultural specialists.
This turned out to be true. It is indeed easier for the offspring of the lower classes such as skilled, unskilled and agricultural
workers to end up in the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats than in the classes of the high- and low-grade social
and cultural specialists. Our results also imply that both the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are more suc-
cessful in preventing their offspring from downward mobility than the high- and low-grade technocrats. These results fully
support our expectations. This ﬁnding is also consistent with the study by Goyette and Muller (2006), showing that college
students from the working class are more likely to major in technical ﬁelds or business than students from middle class
families.
Unexpected, but interesting is the ﬁnding that if one were to collapse the middle class fractions, it would be better to do
this over the high–low boundary than over the technocrats/social and cultural specialists’ boundary. The exchanges between
the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists on the one hand and the remaining classes on the other, and ex-
changes between the high- and low-grade technocrats and the other classes are almost the same according to the external
homogeneity criterion. This means that making a high–low distinction within the social and cultural specialists and among
the technocrats is not as necessary as it is the new class distinction.
Our second hypothesis stated that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists inherit their fathers’ class posi-
tions more often than do the high- and the low-grade technocrats. Bourdieu (1984) claimed that it is easier for the social and
cultural specialists to transmit their class-speciﬁc resources to their offspring whereas this is relatively difﬁcult for the
incumbents of other occupations to acquire these resources. The estimated immobility parameters indeed show that both
the low-grade and especially the high-grade social and cultural specialists inherit more often their origin class than the high-
and low-grade technocrats. Our results support the second hypothesis for men, but not for women. Against our expectation,
women with a technocrat father are even more likely to stay in their father’s class than women with a father in the class of
social and cultural specialist and men from technocrat origins. That is, women having the opportunity to inherit a company
or organizational assets from their father are more inclined to take this opportunity than men in similar position. One inter-
pretation may be that exactly because women with these opportunities are so rare, this gives them a privileged position and
motivates them to stay in their favorable status position. However, the inter-generational mobility patterns of women do not
ﬁt as neatly into our conceptual scheme as those of men and would deserve closer scrutiny in future research.
Our third hypothesis stated that the social and cultural specialists would become relatively more immobile over time.
Note that the overall association between class of origin and destination in the Netherlands has decreased over time: most
dramatically and consistently for the whole period (1970–2006) for men, but also for women towards the second part of this
period. Therefore, the over-time development of the immobility of the assumed classes should be read against the backdrop
of increasing social ﬂuidity. Having said that, we found no conﬁrmation for our trend hypothesis on immobility of new class
fractions. The transmission of class position to offspring is strong for the social and cultural specialists relative to the other
classes in the early periods, but we see a clear downward trend thereafter, in particular for men. Inheritance of class position
of women in the class of the technocrats as well as in the class of the social and cultural specialists decreases somewhat too,
but this trend is not as salient as it is for men.
Our hypotheses have been tested on data for the Netherlands, which constitutes a perfect site for our research aims. Not
only has mobility research from this country produced a wealth of high-quality, detailed and long-ranging intergenerational
data, but Dutch society represents an extreme point of the development toward post-industrialization, with almost 50% of all
workers in the middle classes. There is strong evidence, conﬁrmed by our analysis that a general and steady trend towards
more social ﬂuidity has emerged. It is exactly for these situations that new class theorists have questioned the validity of
traditional class schemata and speculated about the rise of new inequalities in line with distribution of the cultural and hu-
man resources in post-industrial workforces. The truth of such claims can be effectively tested in the Netherlands. While our
analysis clearly conﬁrms that technocrats and social and cultural specialists constitute separate classes with respect to their
intergenerational mobility pattern, we do not ﬁnd any sign of rising inequalities, nor evidence that the collapsing of these
classes in the conventional EGP class scheme helps to explain the general trend towards social mobility in this post-indus-
trial society. Whether our ﬁndings are peculiar to the Dutch mobility regime or would generalize to other welfare states, or
in fact occurs independently of welfare regimes, must be left for further research.
It has often been argued that social classes are ‘‘dying’’ (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Pakulski and Waters, 1996), especially in
the last two decades of the past century. Others have made attempts to convince scholars about ‘‘the promising future of
class analysis’’ (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992) and the need to ‘‘salvage social class’’ (Sørensen, 2000; Grusky and Weeden,
2001). To rescue social class, some authors have also attempted to adjust the existing class schemata (e.g. Oesch, 2006). We
concur with these attempts and encourage scholars to use mobility patterns to further map out class distinctions. We sug-
gest that the external and internal homogeneity criteria as applied in this paper are useful tools to do so. We have effectively
shown in this study that these criteria can be used to validate a class distinction.
To salvage social class, Grusky and Weeden (2001) have come up with a new social class agenda. They claim that some
scholars have prematurely announced the death of class because existing social class concepts would use overly aggregated
occupational groupings and disguise important differences on the disaggregated level. Class effects are only to be found at
the more disaggregated level of occupational groupings since the associated closure devices, e.g. credentials, licences, unions
and private property, primarily operate on this level. More recently, Weeden and Grusky (2005) have proposed a schema that
A. Güveli et al. / Social Science Research 41 (2012) 224–241 239consists of 126 occupational groups that are supposed to represent all social classes in the US. Our results support the idea
that existing class schemes are too aggregated, especially in the middle class. Unfortunately, the Weeden and Grusky’s
(2005) very ﬁne distinctions can hardly be applied to moderately sized datasets such as ours. Another downside of their ap-
proach is that they disaggregate social classes to such a level that one can hardly recognize them as classes: they are mere
occupations. We feel that the moderately ﬁne distinctions we have made in our research are an important compromise be-
tween crude and ﬁne distinctions.Appendix A
See Tables A1–A3.Table A1
Data sources for international occupational mobility among men and women in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2006.
Study Abbreviated study title Men (N) Women (N)
1 net70 National Election Study 1970–1973 746 153
2 net71 Parliamentary Election Study, 1971 693 138
3 net74p Political Action Survey I, 1974 348 280
4 net76j Justice of Income Survey, 1976 618 66
5 net77 CBS Life Situation Survey, 1977 1300 366
6 net77e Parliamentary Election Study, 1977 510 117
7 net79p Political Action Survey II, 1979 580 470
8 net81e Parliamentary Election Study, 1981 637 621
9 net82e Parliamentary Election Study, 1982 488 430
10 net82n National Labour Market Survey, 1982 833 823
11 net82u National Prestige and Mobility Survey, 1982 410 180
12 net85o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1985 967 470
13 net86e Parliamentary Election Study 1986 494 473
14 net87c CBS Life Situation Survey 1986 907 482
15 net87c Cultural Changes [ISSP] 1987 519 561
16 net87j Justice of Income Survey 1987 300 282
17 net87s Primary and Social Relationships, 1987 320 309
18 net88o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1988 496 281
19 net90 Social and Cultural Trends, 1990 896 793
20 net90o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1990 448 244
21 net91j Justice of Income Survey 1991 436 321
22 net92f Netherlands Family Survey I, 11992–93 774 753
23 net92o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1992 451 258
24 net92t Telepanel Stratiﬁcation Survey 796 718
25 net94e Parliamentary Election Study, 1994 587 536
26 net94h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1994 369 479
27 net94o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1994 384 253
28 net95h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 850 788
29 net95s Social and Cultural Trends, 1995 735 765
30 net96 Social Inequality in the Netherlands, 1996 315 272
31 net96o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1996 589 405
32 net98 Social and Economic Attitudes, 1998 372 229
33 net98e Parliamentary Election Study, 1998 590 627
34 net98f Netherlands Family Survey II, 1998 871 857
35 net98o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1999 961 710
36 net99 Use of Information Technology, 1999 1027 698
37 net99a Use of Government Services, 1999 2284 2697
38 net99i International Social Survey Programme, 1999 456 391
39 net00f Netherlands Family Survey III, 2000 639 639
40 net00s Social and Cultural Trends, 2000 416 395
41 net02e European Social Survey, 2002 671 796
42 net03 Netherlands Kinship Panel Survey, 2004 2635 3583
43 net03f Netherlands Family Survey IV, 2003 798 822
44 net04ea European Social Survey, 2004 521 684
45 net04ia International Social Survey Programme, 2004 700 537
46 net06ea European Social Survey, 2006 565 623
47 net06ia International Social Survey Programme, 2006 664 638
Total 32965 28013
See for more information: www.harryganzeboom.nl/ismf.
a These ﬁles have been added to the database used in Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004b). A data ﬁle with all data processed can
be obtained from the third author. Counts have been reweighted using post-stratiﬁcation weights where available, for women
and men separately. Duplicated cases in the Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey 1985–1998 have been reweighed to the
person level.
Table A2
Outﬂow percentages for men in the labor force between 1970 and 2006.
Origin (fathers’ class) Destination (sons’ class)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI VIIa VIIb IVc Total N
Ia 26.4 4.3 21.4 13.7 9.7 3.6 2.5 1.6 2.5 6.5 6.7 0.5 0.5 3689
Ib 25.9 16.5 18.4 15.5 7.7 2.7 1.9 2.4 1.3 4.3 3.2 0.3 0.0 375
IIa 19.8 2.9 24.1 12.4 11.5 4.1 1.5 1.8 3.5 8.9 8.6 0.4 0.6 3482
IIb 18.3 4.7 20.0 26.9 10.5 3.7 1.0 1.0 2.0 6.0 5.3 0.4 0.4 1556
IIIa 16.9 2.5 20.0 14.6 16.5 4.6 1.1 1.3 2.6 11.0 8.2 0.2 0.4 2560
IIIb 13.4 1.0 18.9 12.4 13.2 9.1 1.2 0.9 2.8 15.2 10.2 1.0 0.7 864
IVa 18.1 2.1 17.0 9.3 10.8 5.6 7.3 3.6 3.2 11.2 10.3 0.4 1.1 1380
IVb 12.8 1.4 14.2 9.5 11.7 4.6 6.1 7.3 2.8 14.4 13.6 0.7 0.9 2106
V 16.8 2.6 19.4 8.7 9.3 3.5 0.9 1.7 8.8 14.9 12.1 0.5 0.7 1334
VI 10.7 1.0 14.3 8.7 11.0 4.5 1.5 1.6 5.0 25.0 15.3 0.8 0.6 5983
VIIa 9.9 1.2 12.2 6.5 10.8 4.1 1.2 1.6 5.0 22.4 22.6 1.6 1.0 5060
VIIb 8.0 0.7 9.8 4.6 8.0 3.5 1.6 1.7 4.3 24.7 23.8 5.5 3.7 1082
IVc 10.5 1.4 11.2 6.9 7.3 3.2 1.9 1.7 3.6 12.4 13.9 4.6 21.5 3501
Total 15.0 2.2 16.5 10.6 10.8 4.2 2.0 2.0 3.9 15.3 13.2 1.3 3.0 32972
Table A3
Outﬂow percentages for women in the labor force between 1970 and 2006.
Origin (fathers’ class) Destination class (daughters’ class)
Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI VIIa VIIb IVc Total N
Ia 8.7 4.3 12.3 27.4 23.2 11.2 0.8 1.7 0.6 1.5 7.7 0.2 0.4 3446
Ib 9.0 11.5 12.0 34.4 19.8 5.6 0.7 1.7 0.5 0.5 4.4 0.0 0.0 410
IIa 5.2 3.0 13.1 22.6 26.7 13.9 0.8 1.7 0.4 2.0 9.9 0.4 0.2 3356
IIb 6.3 5.4 10.2 35.3 21.0 10.2 0.4 1.1 0.1 1.5 8.2 0.2 0.1 1514
IIIa 4.9 2.6 8.4 23.9 30.7 13.7 0.9 1.4 0.3 1.9 10.9 0.3 0.0 2209
IIIb 3.5 1.7 6.9 13.6 29.0 17.8 1.1 2.7 0.1 3.2 19.9 0.4 0.1 749
IVa 2.6 2.1 10.8 20.0 25.9 18.6 1.5 2.6 0.2 2.7 12.3 0.2 0.5 1288
IVb 3.7 2.1 8.7 15.7 22.8 17.8 1.8 4.6 0.5 3.8 18.0 0.3 0.3 1506
V 4.8 2.0 13.1 15.2 25.8 15.6 0.9 1.7 0.4 3.3 16.0 0.6 0.5 1122
VI 3.0 1.2 8.2 12.5 24.2 17.6 0.9 2.1 0.6 4.4 24.5 0.6 0.4 5053
VIIa 2.7 0.9 7.2 9.8 22.0 19.5 0.8 2.0 0.6 5.0 28.1 0.9 0.5 4097
VIIb 1.7 0.6 5.5 10.9 17.7 16.0 0.8 1.9 0.1 4.0 37.7 1.9 1.1 724
IVc 3.1 1.8 9.6 16.8 18.2 15.3 1.1 2.6 0.3 2.8 21.4 3.5 3.5 2534
Total 4.4 2.4 9.7 18.6 23.8 15.5 0.9 2.1 0.4 3.1 17.6 0.8 0.6 28008
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